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 We model core demands for better governance (political, economic and institutional), more 
employment and less consumer price inflation using a methodological innovation on the 
complete elimination of cross-country differences in signals susceptible of sparking social 
revolts. The empirical evidence based on 14 MENA countries show that the Arab Spring was 
predictable in 2007 to occur between January 2011 and April 2012. While the findings predict 
the wave of cross-country revolutions with almost mathematical precision, caveats and 
cautions are discussed for the scholar to understand the expositional dimensions of the 
empirics.  
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1. Introduction  
 The Arab Spring has prompted many academics to revise their paradigms and initial 
claims, raising concerns about the usefulness and legitimacy of existing theories. While the 
promptness of scholars to recognize their inabilities to foresee major politico-economic 
unrests is not new, the apologetic stances for failure to predict the Spring has reignited 
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another debate as to whether such cross-country uprisings were predictable in the first place 
(Adi, 2013). This debate is even more relevant with Mitchell (2004, p. 76) postulating that by 
virtue of facts and figures, future trends should be predicted by social sciences with almost 
mathematical precision. This note aims to investigate this Mitchell conjecture. The paper 
attempts to practically answer the key concern on whether politico-economic trends were 
common in the Middle East & North African (MENA) countries prior to the Arab Spring.   
 In the present empirical exercise, we are fully aware of shortcomings of investigating a 
problem without a sound underlying theory. Nonetheless, the act of facts reporting remains a 
useful scientific activity, even without a formal theoretical model. In this vein, we borrow 
from recent literature in the postulation that the validation or refutation of economic theories 
is not the only end of applied econometrics (Narayan et al., 2011).  
 From a theoretical standpoint, the Arab Spring could have either been a predictable 
phenomenon or a spontaneous occurrence. Given the former hypothesis and the catch-up 
intuition motivating the empirical underpinnings, one principal question comes to mind: does 
the complete absence of dispersions in factors that cause social revolts among countries 
foretell a general cross-country chaos? Two underlying assumptions address this question. 
First, the presence of catch-up in signals that cause social uprisings means that countries with 
bad signals are reaching the levels of their counterparts with worse signals. Second, full catch-
up implies that cross-country disparities in signals of revolt are inexistent such that there are 
no distinctions between locality and nationality in the degree of such signals. While the 
answer to the first question informs the policy maker about the feasibility of cross-country 
revolutions, the answer to the second question indicates the timing for such a revolution 
without distinction of nationality. Such negative signals include, inter alia: governance 
standards (institutional, political and economic), unemployment and consumer price inflation.  
 The intuition for a possibility of cross-country harmonization in factors of a common 
event with a timeline conditional on the full (100%) catch-up period has been recently 
4 
 
employed in a plethora of development areas (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013a, 2013b; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016). The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  
    
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We investigate a panel of fourteen MENA countries with data from Development 
Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2006 such that we have a projection date of 
2007. The dependent variables represent potentially negative signals of unrest: 
unemployment, consumer price inflation and quality of government (institutional, political & 
economic). The governance indicators are composite variables obtained from Principal 
Component Analysis. The endogenous variables have been substantially documented in the 
Arab Spring literature as possible causes of the uprisings (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). 
Categorization of the government quality variables is in accordance with Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). Economic governance is represented by regulation quality and government 
effectiveness. Institutional governance is proxied by corruption-control and rule of law. Voice 
& accountability and political stability are used for Political governance. Political 
governance is the process by which authorities are selected and replaced; Economic 
governance represents the capacity of government to formulate & implement policies as well 
as deliver services and; Institutional governance denotes the respect for citizens and the state 
of institutions that govern the interactions among them. We control for determinants of the 
revolutions that have been documented in recent literature (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). 
These include, inter alia: economic prosperity, external balances, population growth, 
government expenditure, and trade openness. In what follows, we briefly substantiate the 
relevance of the control variables. 
 Political unrest can result from the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions. Hence, 
macroeconomic uncertainty in the perspectives of negative and poor economic growth is 
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likely to increase unemployment owing to decreased economic output. From intuition, 
vulnerabilities to external shocks can fuel socio-political unrest partly due to currency 
depreciation and high inflation. High inflation generates inefficiencies that could ultimately 
fuel social tensions because of reduced social welfare and economic growth (see Aisen & 
Veiga, 2006) and decreased opportunities of investment because investors prefer less 
ambiguous economic environments (Kelsey & Le Roux, 2017a, 2017b). Employment and 
other socio-economic opportunities can be boosted through trade and more conducive 
government expenditure. In addition, if population growth is associated with government 
capacity to deliver more public goods and better living standards, the likelihood for political 
instability would be limited.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
The adoption of beta-convergence as estimation technique is typically consistent with 
the recent empirics (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b). The following two equations are 
the standard procedures for investigating this beta catch-up if tiW ,  exhibits strict exogeneity 
(Fung, 2009).  
 
tititititi WYaY ,,,, )ln()ln(    
                      (1) 
where a = 1+ β, tiY ,  measures the signals of social unrest (inflation, unemployment and bad 
governance) in country i at period t. tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of the negative signals,  
i  is a country-specific effect, t  is a time-specific constant and ti ,  is an error term. 
Consistent with the neoclassical growth model, a significantly negative beta coefficient in Eq. 
(1) implies that countries relatively close to a state in which dependent variables will 
experience a slowdown in growth, known as conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 
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2773). In the same light, consistent with Fung (2009, p. 59), when 10  a in Eq. (1),  tiY ,  is 
dynamically stable. A means of dealing with the concern about the correlation between the 
individual specific-effect and the lagged dependent variable involves suppressing the 
individual-effect by first differencing. Therefore, Eq. (2) becomes:  
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln(
,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWYYaYY       (2) 
 We then employ the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that 
exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error 
term. Islam (1995, p. 323) has emphasized that yearly times are inappropriate for 
investigating convergence because in such brief yearly time spans, short-term disturbances 
may be considerable. To assess the rate of diminishing dispersion in the signals of social 
unrests, we calculate the implied rate of convergence by computing: a/2. This implies in our 
regressions, τ is set to 2. Thus, because we have used two-year NOI to control for business 
cycle disturbances, we divide the estimated value of the lagged dependent indicator by 2. To 
ascertain evidence of catch-up, the criterion used is the following: 10  a . This implies 
that past differences have less proportionate effect on future differences.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 Table 2 summaries the findings from Table 3 below. Absolute or unconditional catch-
up is assessed with only the lagged difference of the endogenous variable whereas conditional 
convergence is investigated in the presence of tiW , . But for political governance (in both 
panels of Table 3) and inflation (Panel B of Table 3) in which there is some evidence of 
autocorrelation at the 10% significance level, the models are overwhelmingly valid: (1) failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of AR(2) and Sargan tests and (2) the null hypothesis of the Wald 
test is rejected. 
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  For an estimated initial value of 0.98 (the instruments are significant and there is no 
autocorrelation in the residuals), the following could be established: (1) the catch-up rate is 
49.00% ((0.98/2) × 100) and; (2) the length of time needed for full catch-up is 4.08 years 
(200%/49.00%). Therefore, 4 years (yrs) and about 29 days are needed to reach a 100% catch-
up for an estimated initial value of 0.98 that is consistent with the information criterion: 
10  a . In other words 4 years 29 days are needed for complete elimination of cross-
country dispersions of signals the cause social unrests. Catch-up from an economic point of 
view implies that countries with lower levels in an economic signal are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher levels in the economic signal. Full catch-up further implies cross-
country difference in the economic signal no longer exist. Hence, full catch-up provides 
feasible avenues for harmonized policies related to the economic signal to be implemented 
without distinction of country within a homogenous panel. Whereas the notion of catch-up 
has fundamentally been based on positive macroeconomic variables such as per capita 
positive signals (Jones, 2002; Ssozi & Asongu, 2016) and finance (Narayan et al., 2011; 
Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013c), there is a recent stream of literature that has extended to 
notion policy harmonization in negative signals, notably, in the fight against: software piracy 
(Andrés & Asongu, 2016); capital flight (Asongu, 2014) and terrorism (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017; Asongu et al., 2018). The argument behind extending the nation of catch-
up in economic phenomena to negative economic signals is that it is also logical to harmonize 
cross-country policies in view of fighting negative socio-economic and political signals.  
 Against this background the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The findings 
of political governance are not significant. (2) Economic, institutional and general governance 
results averagely reflect a full catch-up period of between 4.08 and 5. 26 years. (3) For 
inflation and unemployment, only the results of absolute convergence are significant, with 
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those of the latter broadly consistent with the findings from governance indicators (timing of 
5.06 years).  
  
Table 2: Summary of results  











       
 
Panel A: Absolute  Catch-up 
 
Absolute Catch-up No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rate of Catch-up (%) n.a 49 45.5 45.5 8.05 39.5 
Years to Full Catch-up n.a 4.08 4.39 4.39 24.8 5.06 
       
 
Panel B: Conditional Catch-up 
 
Conditional Catch-up No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Rate of Catch-up (%) n.a 44.5 38.0 42.0 n.a n.a 
Years to Full Catch-up n.a 4.49 5.26 4.76 n.a n.a 
       
Yes: Significant evidence of Catch-up. No: insignificant evidence of Catch-up. n.a: not applicable due to absence of significant catch-
up. 
 
Table 3: Information criteria 
       









       
 Panel A: Absolute  Catch-up  
   
Initial (-1) 0.350 0.98*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.161** 0.79*** 
 (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) 
AR(2) 1.739* -1.254 0.879 -0.054 -1.536 0.844 
Sargan OIR 13.517 13.266 13.723 12.965 10.229 3.968 
Wald (joint) 1.553 700*** 284*** 269*** 4.547** 1089*** 
Countries  14 14 14 14 12 5 
Observations  70 70 70 70 57 23 
 
 
     
 
 
     
 Panel B: Conditional Catch-up  
   
Initial(-1) 0.49*** 0.89*** 0.76*** 0.84*** 0.189 2.592 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.201) (0.146) 
AR(2) 1.654* -1.457 0.186 -0.380 -1.815* -1.273 
Sargan OIR 4.115 6.304 5.979 8.553 7.494 n.a 
Wald (joint) 71.08*** 34559*** 604*** 679*** 23.2*** 652*** 
Countries  14 14 14 14 12 5 
Observations  65 65 65 65 54 23 
 
      
*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial (-1): Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation 
test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Z-statistics for AR(2) and Chi-square statistics for Sargan OIR and Wald (joint). The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
The small number of countries in the last column is due to missing observations in the outcome variable. Though inconsistent, the 
corresponding estimates are expositional and do not significantly influence the broad findings. 
   
 In light of the above, from a projection date of 2007, the Arab Spring should occur 
between January 2011 and April 2012. In other words, in the latter interval, cross-country 
differences in signals that could spark revolutions are inexistent, such that a social unrest in 
one country due to the underlying signals can spread to other nations without distinction of 
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locality or nationality. Under these conditions, the possibility of revolts is harmonized 
completely across countries. This inference is in accordance with the recent bulk of catch-up 
literature on IPR harmonization against software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu, 
2013a), inter alia.  
 On cautions and caveats, four points are worth noting. First, findings of conditional 
catch-up are contingent on the variable we choose and empirically test. Hence, the 
conditioning information set may not reflect all determinants of signals in cross-country 
revolutions. Therefore, using alternative variables is not likely to produce different results. 
Nonetheless, the consistency of absolute and conditional catch-up results inherently 
demonstrates less misspecification in the conditioning information set. Moreover, the findings 
are also contingent on the year of forecast because we are unlikely find the same results if 
2008 or 2009 became the year of forecast.  
 Second, signaling is crucial for a good appreciation of the dependent variables, since 
the occurrences of revolutions and social unrests are most likely with negative information. 
Whereas inflation in consumer prices and rising unemployment represent negative signal 
indicators, governance variables may be seen to reflect positive signals. This does not 
represent a major concern for the empirics because governance indicators are skewed to the 
left.  
 Third, critics of the beta-convergence approach have emphasized two main 
shortcomings that could render the catch-up hypothesis unfeasible: (1) differences in initial 
endowments on or conditions in the signals of social unrests, such that movement of the 
dispersion is contingent on the initial distribution of the variables and; (2) the possibility of 
multiple equilibria that negates the hypotheses of long-run convergence towards the same 
path.   
 Last, the employment of econometrics to accomplish beyond testing the validity of 
existing theories has its own shortcomings. While the intuition ground of this paper has been 
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solidly justified by the substantial bulk of a recent strand of studies in the convergence 
literature, it is no less true that theories could originate from consistent empirics.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper contributes to the rising scholarly debates about whether the Arab Spring 
came as a spontaneous phenomenon or could have been predicted by social sciences with 
almost mathematical precision. It has practically answered the key concerns on whether 
politico-economic trends were common in the MENA countries prior to the Arab Spring. We 
have modeled core demands for better governance, less consumer price inflation and more 
employment using a methodological innovation on the complete elimination of cross-country 
dispersion in potential signals of social revolts. The empirical evidence based on 14 MENA 
countries shows that the Arab Spring was predictable in 2007 to occur between January 2011 
and April 2012. While the findings predict the wave of cross-country revolutions with almost 
mathematical precision, caveats and cautions have been discussed for the scholar to 
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